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A partial success of trade cooperation within the ‘16+1’ formula: 
the case of food exports to China
Jakub Jakóbowski
When in 2012 China approached the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with a pro-
posal of cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula, it declared it was willing to meet the needs of CEE 
countries. Beijing had been aware of the political importance of the problem of trade deficit 
(which has been ongoing for years) and launched cooperation with the governments of 16 CEE 
countries to boost imports from these states. The years 2011–2014 brought an improvement 
in the balance of trade between China and: Hungary, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Romania, 
Bulgaria and Croatia. The remaining ten CEE countries recorded an increase in their trade 
deficits. Changes in CEE countries’ balance of trade with China resulted only slightly from 
political actions. Instead, they were due to the macroeconomic situation and to a deteriora-
tion of the debt crisis in the EU which, for example, caused a decline in the import of Chinese 
goods in some of these countries. Multilateral trade cooperation was successfully developed 
in the entire region only in the agricultural and food production sector – the area of greatest 
interest to China. The pace of bilateral cooperation with specific countries varied, with the 
fastest being Poland, Latvia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Actions by governments of CEE 
countries resulted in Chinese market opening up to hundreds of local companies which, in 
turn, translated into an increase in the volume of foodstuffs sold by ‘the 16’ to China from 
US$ 137 million in 2011 to US$ 400 million in 2014. The success achieved in the agricultural 
and food production sector has demonstrated the effectiveness of trade cooperation in the 
‘16+1’ formula. It is, however, insufficient to generate a significant improvement of the trade 
balance. At present, the sector’s share in the total volume of goods sold to China by CEE sta-
tes is a mere 3.7%, and any reduction of the trade deficit would require long-term and more 
comprehensive solutions still to be implemented by the governments of individual CEE states. 
A ‘new opening’ in trade cooperation
The ‘new opening’ in China’s relations with Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, in place since 2011, was 
connected with the creation of a new frame-
work intended to extend economic cooperation. 
The major goals of the ‘16+1’1 cooperation for-
1 Aside from China, this group includes: Poland, Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia.
mula created in 2012 included: boosting Chinese 
direct and infrastructural investments in the re-
gion and deepening trade cooperation, includ-
ing by increasing the turnover of trade with CEE 
countries to US$ 100 billion in four years. CEE 
states hoped to use China’s increased interest in 
cooperation to reduce their trade deficit. Since 
it emerged in the early 1990s, the trade deficit 
has become an issue of political importance and 
a measure of success in relations with China. 
China recognised the need to reduce the defi-
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cit by increasing imports from CEE states and 
included it in the process of devising a diplo-
matic offensive in the region. This meant a clear 
change in China’s position – in previous years, in 
response to the problem of the negative trade 
balance, which CEE countries emphasised, Chi-
na encouraged them to support their local com-
panies in their attempts to enter the Chinese 
market, the way other European countries did. 
The escalation of the debt crisis in the EU in 2012 
turned out to be a barrier to the expected devel-
opment of the trade exchange. It led to recession 
in 8 of the 16 CEE states. Although in 2011–2014 
the value of trade turnover between CEE and 
China increased by 8.2% in total, the dynamics 
of this increase were much lower than they had 
been prior to 2008 when annual increases in 
turnover of more than 25% were being record-
ed. A decline in demand for Chinese consumer 
goods (in particular electronic devices) recorded 
in the CEE region, resulting from the economic 
slowdown, caused a drop in imports from China 
of approximately 9% in 2012. Momentum failed 
to return to imports during the whole period be-
tween 2011 and 2014, with an increase of only 
6.8%. It should be noted that, despite a major 
decline when compared to previous years, ex-
ports from CEE to China were less affected by 
the crisis – in that period the total volume of 
sales increased by almost 18%. The favourable 
economic situation in China at that time was one 
of the causes of this, as were attempts by some 
exporting companies in CEE states to re-orient 
their export to non-European markets. These at-
tempts began in 2008. 
The changes in the structure of trade which 
were related to the crisis in the EU halted the 
increase of the deficit in CEE’s trade with Chi-
na. The intensity of this effect was different in 
individual CEE countries. In 2011–2014, a drop 
in the deficit was recorded in only six of the re-
gion’s countries; the remaining ten recorded an 
increase in the deficit. This was mainly due to 
the differences in the macroeconomic situation 
and in the share of specific categories of goods 
in the trade with China. For example, Poland 
recorded an increase in the deficit of approxi-
mately 27%, while Slovakia recorded a major in-
crease of 76%. On the other hand, in 2011–2014 
the deficit shrank by nearly 27% in Hungary, by 
approximately 20% in Romania, and by approxi-
mately 11% in the Czech Republic. However, data 
compiled for 2014 indicates that the balance of 
trade with China began to decline again in all 
CEE states and the changes connected with the 
debt crisis failed to make a permanent difference 
to the long-term negative structure of trade ex-
change2. China has remained a relatively insig-
nificant export market for CEE states – in 2014 
goods worth US$ 10.6 billion were sold to China, 
which accounted for a mere 1.3% of the total 
volume of exports from the 16 CEE states. On 
the other hand, China continues to be one of the 
CEE region’s main partners in terms of imports. 
In 2014, the total value of imports stood at 
US$ 64.9 billion, which accounted for approxi-
mately 7.8% of total imports to CEE.
Alongside the ‘new opening’ in political rela-
tions with China and the growing economic 
importance of China in the context of the de-
clining economic situation in the EU, the gov-
ernments of CEE states began to view China 
as an alternative sales market and a source of 
capital which could replace Western Europe. As 
a consequence, China began to be included in 
2 The economic slowdown currently observed in China 
has had an impact on trade and is expected to further 
increase the negative trade balance recorded by CEE 
states. According to the Chinese customs office, in the 
first seven months of 2015 trade turnover with the CEE 
region declined by 14.3% year-on-year. Imports from 
CEE were more badly affected by the economic slow-
down (a drop of 11%) than exports from China (a drop 
of approximately 7%).
The economic crisis in the EU has severe-
ly affected imports from China, which 
caused a reduction of the trade deficit 
with China in some CEE states.
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strategic documents concerning the economic 
policy of some CEE states. Similarly, govern-
ments of CEE states devised dedicated ‘China 
programmes’ to support and promote their 
activity in the Chinese market. Despite this, 
in 2011–2014 in bilateral and multilateral con-
tacts between CEE states and China, trade-re-
lated issues were given relatively low priority. 
Most CEE states focused on attracting Chinese 
direct and infrastructural investments which 
were considered an important aspect of coop-
eration in the ‘16+1’ format, and later of the 
New Silk Road. As a consequence, the extent 
to which new opportunities to support lo-
cal exporters have been used in collaboration 
with China partner was different for each CEE 
state and remained relatively insignificant3.
The new Chinese agenda to actively develop 
trade cooperation with the CEE region particu-
larly emphasised one sector of trade – the sector 
of agricultural produce and foodstuffs. Around 
2010, the Chinese government launched diplo-
matic activities aimed at boosting the import of 
foodstuffs from the CEE region. These activities 
intensified in 2014–2015. Using newly created 
platforms to foster dialogue with CEE, China ex-
pressed it was prepared to open its food market 
to exporters from this region. These initiatives 
were welcomed by CEE states. The sector of ag-
riculture and food production turned out to be 
3 One interesting example involved Hungary which man-
aged to develop advanced cooperation with Chinese 
state-run financial institutions to open a credit line for 
exporters worth US$ 200 million. It also signed a cur-
rency swap agreement with China to reduce the risk in-
volved in trade-related transactions.
the only sector in which China and the CEE re-
gion launched wide-ranging activities to boost 
trade and strengthen institutional cooperation 
in both the bilateral and multilateral formulas.
The Chinese food sector 
– large potential, restrictive regulations
China’s involvement in boosting imports of 
foodstuffs from CEE results from the profound 
structural problems which the Chinese sector of 
agriculture and food production faces. The lim-
ited availability of arable land combined with an 
inefficient structure of farms (a large proportion 
of which are small and medium-sized farms) and 
the low efficiency of agriculture all mean that 
local production is barely competitive and rela-
tively expensive. The difference in prices of Chi-
nese and foreign foodstuffs is up to 30–40%, 
depending on the category of products. Addi-
tionally, due to the high level of air pollution 
and several cases when contaminated food was 
passed as being fit for human consumption, 
Chinese consumers prefer foreign-made food-
stuffs. This is particularly evident in the dairy 
sector. As a result of a series of scandals which 
received extensive media coverage and which 
involved for example contaminated infant for-
mula, this sector has been undergoing a serious 
crisis. As a consequence, providing the Chinese 
middle class with safe foodstuffs has become an 
issue of political importance. By fostering more 
advanced cooperation with CEE in the agricul-
ture and food production sector, China is like-
ly to secure supplies of high quality processed 
and non-processed food for itself such as meat, 
dairy products, powdered milk-based infant for-
mula, jams, vegetable oil, honey, processed fish 
products, wine and grains. The Chinese press 
has emphasised the fact that products imported 
from CEE are produced according to the strict 
quality standards applied in the EU, but are also 
considerably cheaper than products made in 
Western Europe which have so far dominated 
the EU’s food exports to China.
The numerous scandals over the quality 
of foodstuffs, combined with the low ef-
ficiency of Chinese agriculture, have con-
tributed to an increase in the volume of 
foodstuffs which China imports. However, 
these imports are strictly regulated.
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Aware of the growing demand for foodstuffs 
in China and of the import pressure, the Chi-
nese government has been trying to reduce the 
country’s dependence on foreign-made food, 
including by implementing protectionist solu-
tions. At present, a reform to alter the struc-
ture of farms is being implemented in China. 
The reform favours big farms. Additionally, 
the state offers subsidies to the production of 
cereals and has introduced strict regulations 
on the import of foodstuffs. Some observers 
claim that the various embargoes imposed 
by China, justified by sanitary reasons, are in 
fact motivated by the intention to support lo-
cal companies by limiting the access foreign 
companies have to the Chinese market. This 
is important from the point of view of CEE – 
currently several countries of the region, in-
cluding Poland, are subject to an embargo on 
the export of pork due to African swine fever4. 
In China, certain restrictions on the import of 
cereals have been introduced, and in order to 
gain access to the Chinese market for meat, 
dairy and fish products, companies are required 
to undergo a complex certification procedure. 
From the perspective of CEE, it is important 
that the current system of regulations applied 
to trade in foodstuffs is two-step – if it is to be 
able to launch export activities a specific state 
needs to have signed a bilateral agreement with 
China and to have made official relations with 
Chinese food safety institutions to launch the 
procedure of certification of individual compa-
4 It should be added, however, that a similar embargo was 
introduced by other East Asian states such as South Ko-
rea and Japan.
nies. Due to this, the political relations and con-
tacts between relevant food safety institutions 
in the partner countries have become issues of 
key importance for the opening of the Chinese 
market to foreign companies. 
The Chinese offer to the region
In the documents prepared during ‘16+1’ sum-
mits in Bucharest (in 2013) and Belgrade (in 
2014) agriculture is the only explicitly indicated 
sector of the economy in which the parties have 
committed themselves to developing trade co-
operation. The scope of this cooperation has 
been described as very broad – the fields of co-
operation mentioned in the document include 
the coordination of food safety regulations, 
fostering trade in agricultural produce, cooper-
ation in animal breeding and food processing. 
In bilateral and multilateral meetings, the Chi-
nese side repeatedly declared its intention to 
develop cooperation in the field of agricultural 
technology and mutual investments.
At the multilateral level, several platforms were 
created to foster cooperation in agriculture on 
an ongoing basis. Since 2013, meetings of the 
China-CEEC Agrotrade and Economic Cooper-
ation Forum have been organised in Europe. 
The forum was established in 2010 as a plat-
form for cooperation between representatives 
of veterinary services, ministries responsible for 
trade and agriculture, local government and 
entrepreneurs. In June 2015, an ‘China-CEEC 
Association for the Promotion of Agricultural 
Cooperation’ was established under the lead-
ership of the government of Bulgaria. It serves 
as a platform for exchanging information and 
for promoting multilateral and bilateral institu-
tional cooperation in the field of food produc-
tion and processing, the development of agri-
cultural technology, bilateral investments and 
the establishment of joint venture companies 
to operate in this sector. In 2015 cooperation 
in agriculture was included in the project of the 
New Silk Road under which a multilateral forum 
for food safety regulations was established. 
The agricultural and food production sec-
tor has become the main area of trade 
cooperation between China and CEE. This 
resulted in the creation of several multi-
lateral and bilateral platforms for inter-
governmental dialogue.
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Alongside coordinating institutions, China is tak-
ing the initiative in the creation of direct instru-
ments to support imports of agricultural produce 
from CEE. International fair of goods imported 
from CEE, organised as part of an annual fair of 
consumer goods in Ningbo, has become China’s 
flagship project developed in 2014–2015. The 
city of Ningbo is intended to play a significant 
role in China’s relations with CEE. The creation 
of a dedicated special economic zone is being 
planned there, and products imported from CEE 
are expected to be granted preferential status 
during customs clearance at the local port. 
The intensive development of multilateral coop-
eration observed in 2014–2015 was combined 
with a revival of bilateral cooperation between 
CEE states and China in the agricultural and 
food production sector. Over the last two years, 
representatives of the Chinese Ministry of Agri-
culture and from food safety institutions visited 
10 of the 16 countries of the region. In 2014 (in 
Romania) and in 2015 (in Estonia) relations be-
tween the ministries of agriculture became insti-
tutionalised in the form of regular meetings of 
working groups. A similar cooperation scheme 
had previously been established with Poland 
and Hungary. Most CEE states have signed bi-
lateral agreements with China regarding the de-
velopment of cooperation in agriculture.
Multi-speed cooperation
Instruments intended to support trade in agri-
cultural produce and foodstuffs, created under 
China’s multilateral initiatives, were targeted 
at all the ‘16+1’ partners. However, the nature 
of Chinese regulations regarding the import of 
foodstuffs has emphasised the role of bilateral 
relations. The pace of development of relations 
with individual states depends on several eco-
nomic and political factors which determine the 
country’s attractiveness in the eyes of their Chi-
nese partner. These factors include: EU mem-
bership, their industrial potential, the structure 
of agriculture, the current climate in the coun-
try’s political relations with China. Of equal im-
portance is the level of activity of the govern-
ments of specific CEE countries in their relations 
with Chinese food safety institutions and the 
Ministry of Agriculture. This activity determines 
the chances of them obtaining certificates for 
the import of foodstuffs. Due to differences in 
the potential and the level of this activity, only 
a few countries have obtained access to 
the Chinese food market. At present, these 
countries make up a major proportion of 
the export of foodstuffs from CEE to China. 
Firstly, the development of cooperation with Chi-
na in the agriculture and food production sector 
which has been observed over recent years has 
largely bypassed the Western Balkan states. Con-
tacts at the ministerial level have been limited 
to meetings in multilateral fora and to relatively 
infrequent bilateral meetings. None of the West-
ern Balkan states has obtained the certification 
required to enter the regulated portion of the 
Chinese food market, and the total volume of ex-
ports of this group of states accounts for a mere 
1.8% of the value of foodstuffs which ‘the 16’ 
exports to China5. China’s limited interest in co-
operation can be justified by the low industrial 
potential of these states, as well as by security 
reasons – most of the region’s states are not EU 
members and the foodstuffs produced there 
usually do not meet EU standards.
The intensity of trade also depends on the cli-
mate of political relations with China. This is 
5 For detailed data on the volume of exports of individual 
‘16’ CEE states to China see Appendix.
Bilateral trade cooperation between China 
and CEE states in the agricultural and food 
production sector has been developing at 
various speed. This mainly results from dif-
ferences in the industrial potential of spe-
cific countries and in the level of activity of 
individual governments.
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evident in the case of Baltic states which have 
tried to gain access to the Chinese meat and 
dairy products market. Following the 2011 
meeting between President Toomas Ilves and 
Dalai Lama, Chinese-Estonian relations were 
suspended for three years. High-level talks were 
resumed only in late 2014 and immediately af-
ter that the government of Estonia launched 
negotiations regarding possible access to the 
Chinese dairy product market. Similarly, Lithua-
nian-Chinese relations were temporarily limited 
as a result of the meeting between President 
Dalia Grybauskaitė and the Tibetan leader in 
2013. Both Estonia and Lithuania have been 
trying to obtain certificates for the export of 
dairy products for several years now, so far 
to no avail. Unlike Lithuania and Estonia, Lat-
via has managed to develop a stable cooper-
ation with China and to obtain certificates for 
the sale of dairy products to China. At present, 
11 Latvian companies have been allowed to 
operate on the Chinese market. All three Baltic 
states have access to the processed fish prod-
ucts market. Political reasons have, to a certain 
degree, played a hand in the development of 
cooperation between the Czech Republic and 
China, which has not been particularly intensive 
over recent years. As a consequence, since the 
granting Czech companies access to the Chi-
nese dairy products market in 2008 (at present 
17 companies hold the relevant certificates), co-
operation in agriculture did not progress until 
the ‘restart’ in bilateral political relations in late 
2014 and early 2015.
The biggest progress in developing coopera-
tion, both in terms of the number of markets 
accessed and of the value of exported food-
stuffs, was achieved by states which have the 
greatest industrial potential, which makes them 
the most attractive partners for China. Over 
recent years, as a result of successful negotia-
tions, Poland has gained access to the Chinese 
markets of: dairy products (71 companies), fish 
products (14 companies), meat (17 companies), 
and to the strictly regulated market of pow-
dered milk-based infant formula (1 company). 
As a consequence, in 2014 the total value of Po-
land’s exports of foodstuffs to China stood at 
US$ 219 million and accounted for nearly 55% 
of total exports from the ‘16’ states. In 2014, 
the government of Hungary managed to gain 
access to the Chinese meat market, mainly fro-
zen beef, pork and poultry – at present, eight 
producers hold the relevant export certificates. 
The case of Bulgaria has been particularly im-
pressive. Bulgaria’s export structure is dom-
inated by cereals, in particular corn which is 
sold as animal feed. In 2013–2014, the value of 
exports in this category of products increased 
from US$ 2.5 million to nearly US$ 49 million. 
In 2014, the value of exports from Romania to 
China was a mere US$ 13 million, however, the 
case of Romania is interesting due to the coop-
eration model adopted. As a result of attempts 
by the government of Romania to obtain access 
to the Chinese meat market, in March 2015 Chi-
na granted the first Romanian company, Smith-
field Romania, a licence to export frozen pork. 
The company had previously been owned by the 
American company Smithfield, the world’s larg-
est producer of pork. In 2013, Smithfield was ac-
quired by the Chinese food company Shuanghui 
International. As a consequence, the only Roma-
nian company to export frozen pork to China is 
de facto owned by Chinese capital. This cooper-
ation model involving China making investments 
in the food production sector in order to deliver 
food to the Chinese market is likely to be copied 
in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Hundreds of producers from CEE states 
have been granted access to the Chinese 
market. As a consequence of this, the val-
ue of exports of foodstuffs to China has tri-
pled within three years. However, the share 
of foodstuffs in the total export volume re-
mains insignificant – in 2014 it was 3.7%.
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‘16+1’ and the development of trade
The deepening of economic cooperation in the 
agriculture and food production sector trans-
lated into an increase in the value of exports in 
this sector. This confirms the success of initia-
tives involving the development of trade which 
were carried out after the ‘new opening’ in re-
lations between China and CEE. Over the years 
2011–2014, the volume of sales continued to 
grow to reach an aggregate increase of 164% 
in the category of agricultural produce and as 
much as 204% in the category of processed 
foodstuffs. These increases were more than ten 
times faster than in other product categories. 
This rapid increase in the export of foodstuffs 
was possible in part due to the very low base-
line level resulting from the lack of access to the 
Chinese market in previous years. In 2014, the 
value of foodstuffs sold to China was approxi-
mately US$ 400 million, whereas in 2011 that 
figure was US$ 137 million. This indicates that 
at present the share of foodstuffs in the total 
volume of exports from CEE to China is slightly 
more than 3.7%. Trade cooperation between 
CEE and China prioritised agricultural produce 
and foodstuffs, and has so far turned out to be 
successful when viewed from the perspective 
of this sector. However, it should not be seen 
as an adequate response to the trade deficit 
which has been in place for years and which 
has deep structural causes. In order for this to 
be eliminated, long-term actions targeted at all 
branches of the economy are required.
The usefulness of the ‘16+1’ format for the devel-
opment of multilateral instruments to boost ex-
ports to China remains limited. In 2011–2015 in 
trade cooperation between CEE and China, the 
emphasis was placed on bilateral relations. This 
was due, in part, to the above-mentioned char-
acteristics of the agricultural and food produc-
tion sector. However, the strong focus of the gov-
ernments of CEE states on bilateral cooperation 
with China and on individual support for local 
exporters was of equal importance. The intensi-
fication of multilateral cooperation in 2014–2015 
resulted largely from a major expansion of the 
group of CEE states which were actively develop-
ing the export of their foodstuffs to China. The 
reason behind this is that the institutions created 
under the ‘16+1’ formula and the New Silk Road 
have played the role of coordinating institutions, 
and this is convenient for China. 
China’s policy involving development of trade 
with CEE has been pursued in two directions. 
Instruments to coordinate and support import, 
targeted at the whole region, are being created. 
Nevertheless, specific agreements still require 
bilateral dialogue. The Chinese government of-
fers favourable conditions for cooperation in 
areas where it intends to boost imports. It is 
important to correctly identify these areas to 
foster the opening of selected markets and to 
include the Chinese partner in the development 
of imports from CEE states. However, the de-
gree to which specific instruments will be used 
will depend on the activity of individual govern-
ments. One precondition of this is maintaining 
good political relations with Beijing. This form 
of cooperation is favourable for CEE states, as 
they continue to prefer their individual initia-
tives of developing cooperation with China and 
of supporting their exporters. It remains the 
task of the specific governments of CEE states 
to fill in the framework of trade cooperation 
created by Beijing. 
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APPENDIX 
The volume of trade between Central and Eastern Europe and China
The main problem in the analysis and assessment of changes in the trade exchange between China 
and CEE involves the selection of trade-related statistics. There are discrepancies in the statistical 
data compiled by the region’s states and those prepared by China involving both the size of trade 
turnover and its structure. For example, according to the Chinese Statistical Office, in 2014 the 
total volume of trade with the 16 CEE countries was approximately US$ 60.2 billion. According 
to statistical offices from CEE states, this figure stood at approximately US$ 77.6 billion. As far as 
the structure of trade is concerned, the Chinese sources indicate a lower volume of exports to CEE 
(US$ 43.7 billion as compared to US$ 64.9 billion) and a higher volume of imports from CEE 
(US$ 16.4 billion vs. US$ 10.7 billion). Detailed statistics regarding the trade exchange between 
China and individual CEE states frequently contain major discrepancies. The most striking example 
is Slovakia. According to Slovak statistics, in 2014 the country recorded a US$ 4.5 billion deficit in 
its trade with China. According to Chinese data, though, Slovakia recorded a trade surplus amo-
unting to US$ 0.54 billion. As far as the total volume of trade in agricultural produce and food-
stuffs is concerned, in both cases the volume of exports of foodstuffs from the 16 CEE states to 
China in 2014 was calculated to be approximately US$ 400 million. Discrepancies have also been 
identified in data compiled for specific states. For example, according to the Chinese Statistical 
Office the value of Hungary’s exports of foodstuffs in 2014 was approximately US$ 21 million, 
while its Hungarian counterpart puts the figure at US$ 36.6 million. For Romania, the figures were 
US$ 12.6 million and US$ 15 million, respectively. 
The discrepancies in trade data most probably result from the fact that different methodologies 
were adopted to compile them, including different categorisations of re-export within the EU and 
that from Hong Kong. These discrepancies, however, do pose problems in assessing the volume of 
trade between CEE and China. The differences in the methods of measuring trade between China 
and its CEE partners may result in conflicting assessments of the development of trade coopera-
tion and of new Chinese economic initiatives. Bearing this in mind, for the purpose of this analysis 
the perspective of Central and Eastern Europe was adopted and the statistical data quoted herein 
were taken from OECD data sources published by the individual countries of the region. 
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The volume of trade between Central-Eastern Europe and China in 2011–2014, 
in US$ millions
State
Export of foodstuffs Total exports Total imports Trade balance
2011 2014 2011 2014 2011 2014 2011 2014
Poland 61 219 1 861 2 251 18 116 22 993 -16 255 -20 742
Hungary 15 36 1 688 2 156 6 076 5 362 -4 388 -3 205
Czech Republic 26 40 1 668 2 033 18 905 17 252 -17 237 -15 219
Slovakia 4 1 2 075 1 825 4 644 6 348 -2 568 -4 523
Romania 4 13 544 759 3 525 3 150 -2 981 -2 390
Bulgaria 3 59 407 709 945 1 147 -538 -439
Estonia 8 13 304 204 1 395 1 500 -1 091 -1 296
Slovenia 3 4 127 186 1 601 1 725 -1 474 -1 539
Latvia 4 8 56 140 414 468 -358 -328
Lithuania 4 4 81 135 628 884 -548 -749
Macedonia 1 1 127 93 355 432 -227 -339
Albania 0.2 0.0 49 83 345 382 -296 -299
Croatia 1 1 55 68 1 605 589 -1 550 -521
Serbia 1 1 15 14 1 488 1 561 -1 473 -1 547
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.1 0.2 6 9 552 922 -546 -913
Montenegro 1 1 1 3 144 176 -143 -173
Source: OECD
